Skill-Details
senior-security
Security engineering.
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SKILL.md
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--- name: "senior-security" description: Use when the user asks for STRIDE threat modeling, DREAD risk scoring, data-flow-diagram threat analysis, or a quick secret scan — or when a security request needs routing to the right specialist skill (pen-testing, incident response, cloud posture, red team, AI security, threat hunting, secure code review). This skill owns threat modeling; everything else routes to a sibling. --- # Senior Security Engineer — Threat Modeling + Security Router This skill does exactly one job itself — **STRIDE/DREAD threat modeling** (plus a quick secret scan) — and routes every other security request to the specialist skill that owns that lane. Do not duplicate sibling content here; route instead. ## Routing Table (read this first) | The user wants... | Route to | Why that skill owns it | |---|---|---| | Vulnerability assessment, pen-test methodology, OWASP Top 10 testing | `../security-pen-testing/` | Ships `vulnerability_scanner.py` + `dependency_auditor.py` with exit-code contracts | | Incident triage, SEV classification, forensics, containment | `../incident-response/` | SEV1–SEV4 taxonomy, NIST SP 800-61 phases, `incident_triage.py` | | Production outage command (non-security incidents) | `../incident-commander/` | Severity classifier + timeline + postmortem tools | | Security monitoring, CVE triage SLAs, compliance checks (SOC 2 etc.), security headers | `../senior-secops/` | `security_scanner.py` + `compliance_checker.py`, CVE SLA table | | Hostile/adversarial code review | `../adversarial-reviewer/` | 3-persona review with BLOCK/CONCERNS/CLEAN verdict | | Secure code review as part of general review | `../code-reviewer/` | Language dispatch + regression fixtures | | Cloud IAM escalation paths, S3 exposure, security groups | `../cloud-security/` | `cloud_posture_check.py` with per-check exit codes | | Threat hunting, IOC sweeps, anomaly detection | `../threat-detection/` | z-score anomaly + IOC staleness tooling | | Red-team engagement planning, ATT&CK kill chains | `../red-team/` | `engagement_planner.py` with authorization gate | | LLM/AI attack surface (prompt injection, poisoning) | `../ai-security/` | ATLAS-mapped `ai_threat_scanner.py` | If the request spans lanes (e.g., "secure this new architecture"), do the threat model here first — its output (prioritized threats + mitigations) tells you which siblings to load next. Never bulk-load multiple security skills speculatively. ## What This Skill Owns: STRIDE Threat Modeling ### Workflow 1. **Scope:** assets to protect, trust boundaries, data flows (external entities, processes, data stores, flows). 2. **Generate the threat model** per component: ```bash python3 scripts/threat_modeler.py --component "User Authentication" --assets "credentials,sessions" --json --output threats.json ``` Output: per-threat STRIDE category, DREAD score (Damage, Reproducibility, Exploitability, Affected users, Discoverability — each 1–10), and suggested mitigations. Repeat per DFD element; `--interactive` walks scoping questions; `--list-threats` shows the threat database. 3. **Consume the output:** sort `threats.json` by DREAD score descending; everything ≥ 7 average needs a named mitigation owner before the design ships. Map each mitigation to the responsible sibling lane (e.g., IAM threats → `cloud-security`, injection threats → `code-reviewer`). 4. **Quick secret sweep** while you have the codebase open: ```bash python3 scripts/secret_scanner.py /path/to/project --format json --severity high ``` 20+ patterns (AWS keys, GitHub tokens, private keys, generic credentials). Any critical/high finding blocks merge until rotated and moved to a secret manager. 5. **Verification gate:** every DFD element has ≥ 1 STRIDE row considered, every threat with DREAD ≥ 7 has an owner + mitigation, and the secret scan exits with zero high/critical findings. Re-run both tools after mitigations land — that re-run is the done signal, not the document.Vollständige Quelle auf GitHub lesen (öffnet externe Seite)